Dorkus Malorkus

Wow.

I’ve been a big fan of Sade for quite some time, but I’ve never caught a live show, and haven’t ever even seen her perform on TV. When I ran across this performance on youtube, I had to watch it.

Having never seen her perform live, I somehow haven’t ever thought about what it was I was missing. Her style’s smooth and sensual; appropriate for her music. If you’re not a big fan, you’ll probably find this a bit mellow, but it’s a really decent song and sounds amazing as a live performance.
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Right, so I read this today, and I’ll quote the full article, as the author I read has done. 

The Gadflyer: Fly Trap:
OK, Maybe We Did Lie
Paul Waldman (9:14AM)

The line from the Bush administration and their allies about the claims they made before the war has been, hey, maybe we were wrong, but it was an honest mistake. It’s not like we knew Iraq didn’t have weapons of mass destruction. It’s not like we knew there were no ties between Iraq and Al Qaeda. We just told the public what we thought.

Although most clear-thinking people see this line for the load of hooey it is, there are only a few pieces of definitive evidence to which one can point that actually prove what the administration knew for sure and didn’t know. I’m talking not about clear omissions or obvious exaggerations, but the smoking gun, if you will. Well now the incomparable Murray Waas gives us such a smoking gun in the National Journal. I’ll quote the article at length:

Key Bush Intelligence Briefing Kept From Hill Panel
By Murray Waas, special to National Journal
© National Journal Group Inc.
Tuesday, Nov. 22, 2005

Ten days after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush was told in a highly classified briefing that the U.S. intelligence community had no evidence linking the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein to the attacks and that there was scant credible evidence that Iraq had any significant collaborative ties with Al Qaeda, according to government records and current and former officials with firsthand knowledge of the matter.

The information was provided to Bush on September 21, 2001 during the “President’s Daily Brief,” a 30- to 45-minute early-morning national security briefing. Information for PDBs has routinely been derived from electronic intercepts, human agents, and reports from foreign intelligence services, as well as more mundane sources such as news reports and public statements by foreign leaders.

One of the more intriguing things that Bush was told during the briefing was that the few credible reports of contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda involved attempts by Saddam Hussein to monitor the terrorist group. Saddam viewed Al Qaeda as well as other theocratic radical Islamist organizations as a potential threat to his secular regime. At one point, analysts believed, Saddam considered infiltrating the ranks of Al Qaeda with Iraqi nationals or even Iraqi intelligence operatives to learn more about its inner workings, according to records and sources.

The September 21, 2001, briefing was prepared at the request of the president, who was eager in the days following the terrorist attacks to learn all that he could about any possible connection between Iraq and Al Qaeda…

The highly classified CIA assessment was distributed to President Bush, Vice President Cheney, the president’s national security adviser and deputy national security adviser, the secretaries and undersecretaries of State and Defense, and various other senior Bush administration policy makers, according to government records.

The Senate Intelligence Committee has asked the White House for the CIA assessment, the PDB of September 21, 2001, and dozens of other PDBs as part of the committee’s ongoing investigation into whether the Bush administration misrepresented intelligence information in the run-up to war with Iraq. The Bush administration has refused to turn over these documents.

Indeed, the existence of the September 21 PDB was not disclosed to the Intelligence Committee until the summer of 2004, according to congressional sources. Both Republicans and Democrats requested then that it be turned over. The administration has refused to provide it, even on a classified basis, and won’t say anything more about it other than to acknowledge that it exists….

But a comparison of public statements by the president, the vice president, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld show that in the days just before a congressional vote authorizing war, they professed to have been given information from U.S. intelligence assessments showing evidence of an Iraq-Al Qaeda link.

“You can’t distinguish between Al Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror,” President Bush said on September 25, 2002.

The next day, Rumsfeld said, “We have what we consider to be credible evidence that Al Qaeda leaders have sought contacts with Iraq who could help them acquire … weapons-of-mass-destruction capabilities.”

The most explosive of allegations came from Cheney, who said that September 11 hijacker Mohammed Atta, the pilot of the first plane to crash into the World Trade Center, had met in Prague, in the Czech Republic, with a senior Iraqi intelligence agent, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, five months before the attacks. On December 9, 2001, Cheney said on NBC’s Meet the Press: “[I]t’s pretty well confirmed that [Atta] did go to Prague and he did meet with a senior official of the Iraqi intelligence service in [the Czech Republic] last April, several months before the attack.”

Cheney continued to make the charge, even after he was briefed, according to government records and officials, that both the CIA and the FBI discounted the possibility of such a meeting.

So the intelligence sure wasn’t wrong on this point. The intelligence was absolutely right. Bush and Cheney simply chose to lie to the public because the intelligence didn’t give them the answer they wanted.

Copyright © Paul Waldman. Material presented on The Gadflyer is the opinion of the respective author and not that of The Gadflyer, the web host or any other entity.